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The Citing of Law Reviews by the
Supreme Court:1971-1999
Louis J. Sinco, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Jeffrey Margulies and I published a study examining the frequency with
which the contemporary United States Supreme Court cited legal periodicals during
two three-year periods spaced seven years apart: the 1971-73 Supreme Court terms
and the 1981-83 Supreme Court terms.' In that article, we highlighted four findings.
First, the Court most frequently cited journals that normally are regarded as elite.2
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., 1967, Yale University;
J.D., 1972, University of Texas. I wish to thank the many research assistants who have worked
on this Article over a number of years, particularly Christopher Dolotosky, Allison Miller,
Christopher Saracino, Stephen Sullivan, and Lane Vines. I also would like to thank my
colleagues John Gotanda and Gregory Magarian for their suggestions.
1. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the
Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986). I later published a similar
study on the citation practices of the United States Courts of Appeals and obtained roughly
parallel results. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the
United States Courts of.Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991).
Other empirical studies ofjudicial citation practices include Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme
Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Joseph A. Custer,
Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court ofAppeal, 7 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 120 (1998); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source
Citations in UnitedStates Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76
L. LIBR. J. 1, 30-32 (1983); Scott Finet, The Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal
Periodicals, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Nos. 3-4 1989, at 227; Lawrence M. Friedman
et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981);
Laura K. Justiss, A Bibliometric Study of Texas Law Reviews, 85 L. LIR. J. 407 (1993);
Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska
Law Review andthe Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76NEB.L.REV. 708 (1997); James
Leonard, AnAnalysis ofCitations to Authority in OhioAppellate Decisions Published in 1990,
86 L. LIAR. J. 129 (1994); Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law
Review Contributes to the Development of Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 39,61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977:
A StatisticalAnalysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 61 (1979); Richard A. Mann, The Use of
Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 (1986); William H. Manz,
The Citation Practices of the New York Court ofAppeals, 1850-1993, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 121
(1995); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use ofLegalScholarship by Courts: An Empirical
Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An
Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and
1970,50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United
States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477,481-82 (1959); John Scurlock, Scholarship and
the Courts, 32 UMKCL. REV. 228,232-58 (1964); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the
Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); Bart Sloan, Note, What Are We
Writingfor? Student Works as Authority and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221 (1992).
2. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 132-34.
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Second, from the first study period to the second, it cited journal articles less
frequently Third, from the first period to the second, it cited neither the group of
elite journals nor the group of infrequently cited journals significantly more or less.4
Fourth, the Court cited certain journals with increasing frequency.'
The present study updates the earlier effort to offer us a look at the Court's citation
practices over an extensive period. Here, we examine citation practices during the
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, and 1996-98 Supreme Court Terms, 6 giving us four
three-year periods as samples over the twenty-eight years. Our findings generally
mirror our earlier ones. We find a continuing decline in number of times the Court
cited legal periodicals and a noticeable decrease in citations to the top tier of law
journals. This latter phenomenon is primarily due to a remarkable decline in the
number of citations to the Harvard Law Review.
7
II. METHODOLOGY
In our previous study, we engaged in electronic searches to locate citations.'
Because the Court opinions use a wide variety of citation forms to identify journals,
we tried to enter as search terms every possible variation and then followed up with
spot checks on the printed page.
For this study, we selected the very traditional method of reading all the pages
without electronic assistance.9 Because a reader still can miss a citation, this method
is not foolproof; however, it is at least as accurate than our previous method, if not
more so. Though we were confident of the results of the first study, we are even more
confident of the current results. 0
III. THE DOMINANCE OF THE ELITE JOURNALS
Most of the Court's citations continue to refer to journals that are generally
regarded as elite. Ofthe nine law journals that were most frequently cited in 1971-73,
all were among the nine most frequently cited in 1981-83." Eight of the original
3. See id. at 134-35.
4. See id. at 135-36.
5. See id. at 136-37.
6. The Supreme Court terms run from October to July. Thus, the 1991-93 survey period
runs from October 1991 to the end of the term in July 1994.
7. Appendix III, infra, most graphically shows these results.
8. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 132 n.3.
9. We counted citations only in memorandum opinions, including concurring opinions
and dissents. On the difficulties of counting citations electronically, see McClintock, supra
note 1, at 684. For purposes of consistency, we counted a citation only when the citation
included the name of the law journal. For example, we would not count an "id." In the
Supreme Court opinions, there are very few short forms of citations referring to lawjourals.
10. Our results are corroborated by a more modest study, McClintock, supra note 1, at
682-95 (using three two-year survey periods and conducting an electronic search of 40 law
journals).
11. In descending order of frequency (1981-83), they were the Harvard Law Review,
Columbia Law Review, Yale Law Journal, University of Chicago Law Review, Michigan Law
1010 [Vol. 75:1009
2000] CITING OF LAWREVIEWS BY THE SUPREME COURT
group were among the nine most frequently cited in 1991-93,2 and six were on this
elite list in 1996-98.' 3 In each time period, these journals were ranked in different
orders. Sevenjournals were among the top ten in all four times periods: the Columbia
Law Review, Harvard Law Review, Michigan Law Review, Stanford Law Review,
University of Chicago Law Review, Virginia Law Review, and Yale Law Journal.14
The two journals in this category in three of the four time periods were the California
Law Review and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. The New York
University Law Review was in this category in two of the four time periods.
We can only speculate on why the elite journals dominate. The three possible
reasons we raised in previous articles are still the most likely ones.'" First, the Court
may find the articles in these journals more helpful. Second, the Court may tend to
cite articles mentioned in the attorneys' briefs; in turn, the attorneys may cite articles
from elite journals in the beliefthat citations to these articles may make an argument
more persuasive. Third, the justices may hire clerks primarily from elite schools, who
then prefer to cite the journals that they once staffed.
IV. DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF CITATIONS
The number of citations to legal periodicals has suffered a steady decline from 963
in the 1971-73 period, to 767 in the 1981-83 period, to 577 in 1991-93, and to 271
in 1996-98.16 Manyjournals show a modest drop in citations, which accounts for the
general decrease. One possible explanation is that the Court's current conservative
jurisprudence focuses on deciding cases on narrow grounds and does not find much
legal scholarship to be helpful, particularly the theoretical scholarship that most often
appears in the elitejournals.' 7 A court that strongly prefers to decide issues on narrow
Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, California Law Review, Virginia Law
Review, and New York University Law Review. In this latter period, the Stanford Law Review
tied theNew York University Law Review for ninth place. In 1971-73, the StanfordLawReview
tied for 11 th place with the Georgetown Law Journal. See infra Appendix III.
12. In descending order of frequency (1991-93), they were the Harvard Law Review,
Columbia Law Review, Yale Law Journal, University of Chicago Law Review, California Law
Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Michigan Law Review, and Virginia Law
Review. The Stanford Law Review, ranking 11 th in 1971-73, ranked 8th. See infra Appendix
III.
13. In descending order of frequency, they were the Harvard Law Review, Yale Law
Journal, Columbia Law Review, Michigan Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review,
and Virginia Law Review. The Stanford Law Review and the Cornell Law Review tied for
seventh place, and the Duke Law Journal and the Vanderbilt Law Review tied for ninth place.
None of these four journals were among the top nine in 1971-73. They ranked 11 th, 29th,
22nd, and 18th, respectively. See infra Appendix III.
14. For authority for this information and for the information in the rest of this paragraph,
see infra Appendix III.
15. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 133-34; Sirico & Drew, supra note 1, at 1055.
16. See infra Appendix III.
17. For a defense ofthisjudicial philosophy, see CAss R. SuNsTEIN, ONE CASEATA TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
Debates over the value of academic legal scholarship and the function of law reviews have
yielded an 6xtensive literature-too much to include in a bibliographic footnote. The germinal
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grounds and has great respect for stare decisis is not strongly interested in academic
arguments encouraging it to break new analytical ground. 8
A consideration ameliorating the dramatic nature of our findings is that in the last
two survey periods, the Court has issued fewer full opinions disposing of the cases
on their merits. Yet, factoring in this consideration does not affect our findings
appreciably. One set of calculations arguably supports this conclusion. Ifwe calculate
the number of law journal citations per opinion for each survey period-counting
separately each majority, per curiam,' 9 plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinion-there were 0.86 citations per opinion in the 1971-73 terms,2" 0.68 citations
per opinion in the 1981-83 terms,2' 0.75 citations per opinion in the 1991-93 terms,'
articles are Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Fred Rodell,
Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). In the current literature,
some of the most prominent contributions are Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 34 (1992); Kenneth
Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV.
926 (1990); James Lindgren, AnAuthor's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1994); Michael
J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?:
4 Systematic Comparison ofLaw ReviewArticles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REv.
353 (1996); Special Issue, Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1117 (1995); Max Steir
et al., Law Review Usage andSuggestionsfor Improvement: A Survey ofAttorneys, Professors,
and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Jean R. Stemlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and
Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Jurisprudence ofLaw and Practical Applications, 50
U. MIAMI L. REv. 707 (1996); Symposium, Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 742 (1996).
18. Another question is whether legal scholarship really has grown more theoretical and
less practical over the years. In an interesting study, Professor Michael Saks and his colleagues
compared two samples of nonstudent law journal articles from nonspecialized law school
publications from two periods: 1960 and 1985. See Saks et al., supra note 17, at 361.
According to the reviewers, the utility of the articles from one period to another increased most
visibly to scholars and "by a marginally significant amount" to judges and legislators; there
was "no statistically detectable change" in utility for practitioners. Id. at 369. They found the
1980 articles more critical of existing law and more theoretical, particularly among the elite
journals. See id. at 370-71. Yet, as the authors point out, with the proliferation of law journals,
there has been an increase in the number of practical articles. See id. The authors conclude:
"The top-quintilejoumals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and
the most experimental kind of scholarship and less a forum for exchanges among legal
scholars, practitioners, andjudges." Ie at 374. They suggest that if courts look beyond the elite
journals, they will find articles that are more useful and more worthy of citation. See id.
19. Included in the count are only those per curiam opinions more than a few lines long.
20. There were 963 law journal citations in 1115 opinions. In arriving at the number of
opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report
on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 297 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
HARV. L. REV. 57, 303 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 274
(1974).
21. There were 767 law journal citations in 1127 opinions. In arriving at the number of
opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the Harvard Law Review's annual report
on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 304 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97
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and 0.47 citations per opinion in the 1996-98 terms.' Thus, with the exception of the
1991-93 terms, these calculations show a steady decline in the number of citations per
opinion.
Our findings are even more remarkable when we break down the citations
according to the Justices responsible for them. In our earlier study covering the
1971-73 and 1981-83 terms, we found that except perhaps for Justice Black, none of
the Justices seemed to be abnormally sparing or free in citing secondary sources.24
However, for the 1996-98 terms, we reach a far different conclusion. During that
period, Justice Souter was responsible for 72 of the 172 citations. The Justice citing
the second greatest number of law journals was Justice Breyer with -forty-three
citations, followed by Justices Stevens (thirty-seven), Scalia (thirty), Ginsburg
(twenty-nine), Thomas (twenty-four), Rehnquist (sixteen), and Kennedy (nine).2"
Thus, without Justice Souter, the number of citations in Supreme Court opinions
would be considerably lower.
Of the elite journals, the periodical showing the most stunning decline is the
Harvard Law Review. The number of citations to that journal went from 169 in
1971-73, to 115 in 1981-83, to 68 in 1991-93, to 30 in 1996-98.26 This finding is
somewhat puzzling. Although it is easy to conclude that the most elite journals are
publishing primarily for the scholar, rather than the bench or bar, it is still difficult to
determine why the Harvard Law Review has suffered such a decline. It would not
appear to even more academic than similar elite journals. Perhaps, even though we
might classify many articles in these journals as academic, a greater percentage of
those in the Harvard Law Review have less immediately practical value than those
in the comparable journals. This conclusion can be only speculative.
HARV. L. REv. 70, 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 307
(1984).
22. There were 577 law journal citations in 772 opinions. In arriving at the number of
opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the HarvardLaw Review's annual report
on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163,378 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107
HARv. L. REv. 144,372 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139,372
(1994).
23. There were 271 law journal citations in 579 opinions. In arriving at the number of
opinions, we relied on the calculations appearing in the HarvardLaw Review's annual report
on the most recent Supreme Court term in a section entitled "The Statistics." See The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term, Ill HARV. L. REV. 51, 431 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, 112
HARV. L. REV. 122, 366 (1998). For the 1998 term, we calculated our own statistics.
24. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 1, at 134-35.
25. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable statistics for the other survey periods.
26. See infra Appendix Il. If we calculate the number of citations to the Harvard Law
Review per full opinion-counting separately the majority, plurality, per curiam, concurring,
and dissenting opinions-there would be 0.152 citations per opinion in the 1971-73 terms,
0.102 citations per opinion in the 1981-83 terms, 0.088 citations per opinion in the 1991-93
terms, and 0.052 citations per opinion in the 1996-98 terms. For the number of citations to the
Harvard Law Review, see infra Appendix III. For the calculation of the number of written
opinions per term, see supra notes 20-23.
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V. GENERAL CONSISTENCY IN How FREQUENTLY
PARTICULAR JOURNALS ARE CITED
Over the twenty-five years, only the top ten percent of cited journals has shown a
noticeable drop in the percentage of citations garnered.27 As previously noted, this
drop is largely due to the decline in citations to the Harvard Law Review.28 Thus, in
1971-73, the top 10% of cited journals held 58.36% of all citations;29 in 1981-83, the
percentage decreased to 56.84%,"° an insignificant change.' In 1991-93, the
percentage declined to 52.69%,"' and, in 1996-98, it declined to 47.97%.32 Despite
the decline, then, the elite journals have continued to dominate.
In contrast to the top 10%, in 1971-73, the bottom 50% held only 9.03%; 33 in
1996-98, this group held 16.97%3 4 It is risky to use these statistics to find a trend
favoring these journals, because the comparable data for the other two periods does
not support this conclusion. In 1981-83, this group claimed 10.04% of all citations,
35
and, in 1991-93, it claimed 11.09%.36 Thus it would require surveys of future years
to determine whether or not these journals are receiving greater acknowledgment by
the Court.
If there is a trend favoring the less elite journals, it may be due to the growth of
electronic legal research tools. In a previous era, researchers would naturally limit
searches to a relatively small group ofjournals, most likely the most elite journals.
In the electronic era, researchers can easily survey a wide group ofjournals. If the
Court is looking for more traditional doctrinal scholarship than it is finding in the
very elite journals, it may find the desired literature there.37
VI. INCREASED CITATION OF CERTAIN JOURNALS
Although the number of citations amassed by most journals has not significantly
changed from one period to the next, some journals have succeeded in garnering an
increasing percentage of all citations by the Court. If we use as our sample the
seventeen most frequently cited journals in 1996-98, the only journal showing a
dramatic increase in citations from 1971-73 to 1996-98 was the UCLA LawReview.38
In this group, the only journal showing an increase in citations both from 1981-83 to
27. See infra Appendices VIII, IX, X.
28. See supra text accompanying note 21.
29. See infra Appendix VIII.
30. See infra Appendix IX.
31. See infra Appendix X.
32. See infra Appendix VIII.
33. See infra Appendix IX; supra note 18.
34. See infra Appendix VIII.
35. See infra Appendix IX.
36. See infra Appendix X.
37. See supra note 18.
38. See infra Appendix V. During the 1971-73 period, the Court cited the UCLA Law
Review once. See id. In 1981-83, the Court cited it seven times. See infra Appendix III. In
1991-93, the Court cited it 12 times. See id. In 1996-98, the Court cited it four times. See id.
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1996-98 and from 1991-93 to 1996-98 was the Boston College Law Review.3"
VII. THE DOMINANCE OF RECENT ARTICLES
The Supreme Court primarily cites recent articles. For example, for the 1996-98
period, 47.60% of all articles cited were published since 1990, and 21.77% were
published since 1995.40 Presumably the justices view these sources as particularly
persuasive and the most accurate reflection of the current state of the law and modes
of legal analysis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As was true of our previous study, our present study shows a continuing decline in
judicial reliance on legal periodicals by the court that is by its nature most
policy-oriented and would seem to be the most receptive to legal scholarship.
Although the issue is certainly open to debate, it seems clear that elite legal academics
are spending more time speaking to one another than they are speaking to the highest
court in the land .
4
39. See infra Appendices VI, VII. In 1981-83, the Court cited the Boston College Law
Review once. See infra Appendix VI. In 1991-93, the Court cited it once. See infra Appendix
VII. In 1996-98, the Court cited it four times. See id. Of course, dealing with such small
numbers permits calculating dramatic percentages.
In an era of declining citations, it is noteworthy when ajournal continues to enjoy roughly
the same number of citations during most of the survey periods. Among the top journals, this
group includes the California Law Review, Cornell Law Review, Duke Law Journal, and
Vanderbilt Law Review. See infra Appendix III.
40. For a graphic presentation of these statistics, see infra Appendices XI, XII. These
statistics use the date on the spine of the journal volume as the date of publication. Because
journals are regularly published late, the Court relies on recent articles even more than these
numbers suggest. We found consistent results in a study of the citation practices of the United
States Courts of Appeals. See Sirico & Drew, supra note 1, at 1055-56, 1060. Our findings are
also consistent with the citation practices in other scholarly fields. See James Leonard, Seein'
the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in RecentAmerican Law Review Articles, 34 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 181, 204-05 (1990).
41. A corroborating study is Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges andScholars:
Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENTL. REV.
871 (1996). It compared the articles most frequently cited by state and federal courts with
articles most frequently cited by scholarly journals and found that the two groups of articles
diverged dramatically. See id at 880. According to the study, the two groups differ in four
respects: subject matter, scholarly perspective, average prestige of the journals in which they
are published, and certain characteristics of the authors (the law schools from which they
graduated and whether they held named professorships or chairs). See id. at 897.
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APPENDIX I
FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, OCT. 1996-OCT. 1998
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal (a) No. of Citations (b) Percentage of
(1996- All Citations
1998)
1 HARv. L. REV. 30 11.11%
2 YALE L.J. 23 8.51%
3 COLUM. L. REV. 18 6.67%
4 MICH. L. REV. 12 4.44%
5 U. CHi. L. REV. 10 3.70%
6 VA. L. REV. 9 3.33%
7 CORNELL. L. REV. 8 2.96%
8 STAN. L. REV. 8 2.96%
9 DUKE L.J. 6 2.22%
VAND. L. REV. 6 2.22%
11 N.Y.U. L. REV. 5 1.85%
U. PA. L. REV. 5 1.85%
13 B.C.L. REV. (c) 4 1.48%
CAL. L. REv. 4 1.48%
GEO. L.J. 4 1.48%
S. CAL. L. REV. 4 1.48%
UCLA L. REV. 4 1.48%
WASH L. REV. 4 1.48%
YALE. J. ON REG. 4 1.48%
20 ARK. L. REV. 3 1.11%
B.U.L. REV. 3 1.11%
DUQ. L. REV. 3 1.11%
EMORY L.J. (d) 3 1.11%
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3 1.11%
IOWA. L. REV. 3 1.11%
Nw. U. L. REV. (e) 3 1.11%
27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 2 0.74%
AM. J. INT'L L. 2 0.74%
FORDHAM L. REV. 2 0.74%
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2 0.74%
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2 0.74%
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2 0.74%
MINN. L. REV. 2 0.74%
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2 0.74%
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 2 0.74%
TEx. L. REV. 2 0.74%
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2 0.74%
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 0.37%
ARIz. L. REV. 1 0.37%
1016 [Vol. 75:1009
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APPENDIX I CONTINUED
FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, OCT. 1996-OCT. 1998
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of Citations Percentage of
(1996- All Citations
1998)
BANKING L.J. 1 0.37%
BUS. LAW. 1 0.37%
CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 0.37%
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 0.37%
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. I 0.37%
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 0.37%
CONST. COMM. 1 0.37%
CONST. L.J. 1 0.37%
CRIM. L. BULL. 1 0.37%
DEF. COUNS. J. 1 0.37%
ENERGY L.J. 1 0.37%
FED. COMM. L.J. 1 0.37%
FLA. B.J. 1 0.37%
F.R.D. (f) 1 0.37%
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 1 0.37%
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 0.37%
GA. L. REV. 1 0.37%
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 0.37%
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 0.37%
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 0.37%
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 0.37%
IDAHO L. REV. 1 0.37%
INT'L BUS. LAW. 1 0.37%
J. MARSHALL L. REV. (g) 1 0.37%
J.L. & HEALTH 1 0.37%
J.L. & TECH. 1 0.37%
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 0.37%
LA. L. REV. 1 0.37%
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 0.37%
ME. L. REV. 1 0.37%
MD. L. REV. 1 0.37%
MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 0.37%
NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 0.37%
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 1 0.37%
N.C. L. REV. 1 0.37%
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 0.37%
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 0.37%
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APPENDIX I CONTINUED
FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, OCT. 1996-OCT. 1998
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of Citations Percentage of
(1996- All Citations
1998)
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 0.37%
S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 0.37%
SMU L REV. 1 0.37%
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 0.37%
STAN. L.J. BUS. & FIN. 1 0.37%
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 0.37%
TULSA L.J. 1 0.37%
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 0.37%
U. BALT. L. REv. 1 0.37%
U. CIN. L. REv. 1 0.37%
U. COLO. L. REv. (h) 1 0.37%
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1 0.37%
U. FLA. L. REv. 1 0.37%
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 0.37%
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 0.37%
U.S.F. L. REV. 1 0.37%
VILL. L. REV. 1 0.37%
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 0.37%
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 0.37%
W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1 0.37%
Wis. L. REv. 1 0.37%
(a) The Court cited 97 journals.
(b) The Court cited journals 271 times. The calculation ofjournal cites may
include multiple citings of the same journal within the same Supreme
Court case. See supra note 9.
(c) In November 1977, the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review changed its title to the Boston College Law Review, beginning with
volume 19.
(d) In 1974, the Journal of Public Law changed its title to the Emory Law
Journal, beginning with volume 23.
(e) In March-April 1952, the Illinois Law Review changed its title to the
Northwestern University Law Review, beginning with volume 47.
(f) The Court cited the Federal Rules Decisions one time. Citations to cases
in the Federal Rules are not included.
(g) In Winter 1980, the John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure
became the John Marshall Law Review, beginning with volume 13.
(h) In Fall 1962, the Rocky Mountain Law Review changed its title to the
University of Colorado Law Review, beginning with volume 35.
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, OCT. 1991-OCT. 1993
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal (a) No. of Citations (b) Percentage of
(1991- All Citations
1993)
1 HARV. L. REV. 68 11.79%
2 COLUM. L. REv. 45 7.80%
3 YALE L.J. 42 7.28%
4 U. CHI. L. REV. 26 4.51%
5 CAL. L. REv. 21 3.64%
6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16 2.77%
7 MICH. L. REv. 15 2.60%
8 STAN. L. REV 13 2.25%
VA. L. REV. 13 2.25%
10 S. CAL. L. REv. 12 2.08%
UCLA L. REV. 12 2.08%
12 U. PA. L. REV. 11 1.91%
13 GEO. L.J. 10 1.73%
SUP. CT. REV. 10 1.73%
15 FORDHAM L. REV. 9 1.56%
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9 1.56%
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 8 1.39%
CORNELL L. REV. 8 1.39%
DUKE L.J. 8 1.39%
MINN. L. REV. 8 1.39%
21 HASTINGS L.J. 7 1.21%
Nw. U. L. REV. (c) 7 1.21%
23 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 6 1.04%
IOWA L. REV. 6 1.04%
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 6 1.04%
TEX. L. REV. 6 1.04%
VAND. L. REV. 6 1.04%
WM. & MARY L. REV. 6 1.04%
29 B.U. L. REV. 5 0.87%
DEPAUL L. REV. 5 0.87%
J. CORP. L. 5 0.87%
J.L. & ECON. 5 0.87%
JURIMETRICS J. 5 0.87%
TAX NOTES 5 0.87%
35 TAX LAW. 4 0.69%
U. FLA. L. REV. 4 0.69%
37 AM. J. INT'L L. 3 0.52%
BYU L. REV. 3 0.52%
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 3 0.52%
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, OCT. 1991-OCT. 1993
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of Citations Percentage of
(1991- All Citations
1993)
GA. L. REv. 3 0.52%
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 3 0.52%
J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK]
OFF. SOC'Y 3 0.52%
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3 0.52%
44 AM. BANKR. L.J. 2 0.35%
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 2 0.35%
Bus. LAW. 2 0.35%
CONN. L. REV. 2 0.35%
CRIME & DELNQ. 2 0.35%
DICK. L. REV. 2 0.35%
EMORY L.J. (d) 2 0.35%
F.R.D. (e) 2 0.35%
J. MARSHALL L. REv. (f) 2 0.35%
J. LEGAL STUD. 2 0.35%
JUDICATURE 2 0.35%
MIL. L. REv. 2 0.35%
Mo. L. REv. 2 0.35%
OHIO ST. L.J. 2 0.35%
RECUEIL DES COURS (g) 2 0.35%
TUL. MAR. L.J. 2 0.35%
U. CiN. L. REv. 2 0.35%
U. PITT. L. REv. 2 0.35%
VILL. L. REV. 2 0.35%
Wis. L. REv. 2 0.35%
YALE J. INT'L L. 2 0.35%
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 2 0.35%
66 A.B.A.J. 1 0.17%
ADMIN. L. REV. 1 0.17%
AKRON L. REV. 1 0.17%
ALA. L. REv. 1 0.17%
ALB. L.J. 1 0.17%
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 0.17%
AM. U. L. REv. 1 0.17%
ANTITRUST BULL. 1 0.17%
BANKR. DEV. J. 1 0.17%
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1 0.17%
B.C.L. REV. (h) 1 0.17%
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 0.17%
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SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of Citations Percentage of
(1991- All Citations
1993)
BROOK. L. REV. 1 0.17%
BUFF. L. REV. 1 0.17%
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 0.17%
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1 0.17%
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 0.17%
CRiM. L. BULL. 1 0.17%
CUMB. L. REv. 1 0.17%
HAMLNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1 0.17%
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 0.17%
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 0.17%
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 0.17%
HOW. L.J. 1 0.17%
IND. L.J. 1 0.17%
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1 0.17%
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1 0.17%
J. AIRL. & COM. 1 0.17%
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 0.17%
J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 0.17%
J. ST. TAX'N 1 0.17%
J. TAX'N 1 0.17%
KAN. L. REV. 1 0.17%
LAB. LAW. 1 0.17%
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 0.17%
LAW Q. REv. 1 0.17%
L. & SOc'Y REv. 1 0.17%
LA. L. REv. 1 0.17%
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 0.17%
MD. L. REV. 1 0.17%
MIss. L.J. 1 0.17%
MONT. L. REV. 1 0.17%
N.Y. ST. B.J. 1 0.17%
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 0.17%
N.C. L. REV. 1 0.17%
PAC. L.J. 1 0.17%
PEPP. L. REV. 1 0.17%
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 0.17%
SETON HALL L. REV. 1 0.17%
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, OCT. 1991-OCT. 1993
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of Citations Percentage of
(1991- All Citations
1993)
S. ILL. U.L.J. 1 0.17%
STETSON L. REV. 1 0.17%
TEMP. L.Q. 1 0.17%
TEX. B.J. 1 0.17%
U. COLO. L. REV. (i) 1 0.17%
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 0.17%
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 0.17%
UTAH B.J. 1 0.17%
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 0.17%
W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 0.17%
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1 0.17%
(a) The Court cited 125 journals.
(b) The Court cited journals 577 times. The calculation ofjournal cites may
include multiple citings of the same journal within the same Supreme
Court case. See supra note 9.
(c) In March-April 1952, the Illinois Law Review changed its title to the
Northwestern University Law Review, beginning with volume 47.
(d) In 1974, the Journal of Public Law changed its title to the Emory Law
Journal, beginning with volume 23.
(e) The Court cited articles in the Federal Rules Decisions two times.
Citations to cases in the Federal Rules are not included.
(f) In Winter 1980, the John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure
changed its title to the John MarshallLawReview, beginning with volume
13.
(g) Recueil des Cours is published by the Hague Academy of International
Law.
(h) In November 1977, the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review changed its title to the Boston College Law Review, beginning with
volume 19.
(i) In Fall 1962, the Rocky Mountain Law Review changed its title to the
University of Colorado Law Review, beginning with volume 35.
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal(a) No. of No. of No. of No. of
(1996- Citations(b) Citations Citations Citations
1998) (1971-73) (1981-83) (1991-93) (1996-98)
1 HARV. L. REV. 169 115 68 30
2 YALE L.J. 68 51 42 23
3 CoLuM. L. REV. 53 52 45 18
4 MICH. L. REV. 27 32 15 12
5 U. Cin. L. REV. 29 40 26 10
6 VA. L. REV. 37 21 13 9
7 CORNELL L. REV. 6 10 8 8
STAN. L. REV. 21 17 13 8
9 DUKE L.J. 9 9 8 6
VAND. L. REV. 10 10 6 6
11 N.Y.U.L. REV. 26 17 16 5
U. PA. L. REV. 44 25 11 5
13 B.C.L. REV. (c) 5 1 1 4
CAL. L. REV. 27 23 21 4
GEO. L.J. 21 16 10 4
S. CAL. L. REV. 10 6 12 4
UCLA L. REV. 1 7 12 4
WASH. L. REV. 0 0 0 4
YALE J. REG. 0 0 0 4
20 ARK. L. REV. 0 0 0 3
B.U.L. REV. 1 5 5 3
DUQ. L. REV. 0 0 0 3
EMORY L.J. (d) 2 0 2 3
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3 3 1 3
IOWA L. REV. 10 0 6 3
NW. U. L. REV. (e) 9 11 7 3
27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 2 2 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 3 3 2
FoRDHAM L. REV. 6 3 9 2
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 0 0 0 2
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 0 0 0 2
HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 0 0 1 2
MINN. L. REV. 0 0 0 2
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 6 1 6 2
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 0 0 0 2
TEx. L. REV. 8 9 6 2
WM. & MARY L.
REV. 4 0 6 2
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of No. of No. of No. of
(1996- Citations Citations Citations Citations
1998) (1971-73) (1981-83) (1991-93) (1996-98)
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 0 0 0 1
ARIz. L. REV. 0 0 0 1
ARK. LITrLE ROCK
L.J. 0 0 0 1
BANKING L.J. 0 0 0 1
BUS. LAW. 0 3 2 1
CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 0 0 6 1
CATH. U. L. REV. 0 0 1 1
COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 0 0 1 1
COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 0 0 0 1
CONST. COMM. 0 0 0 1
CONST. L.J. 0 0 0 1
CRIM. L. BULL. 1 0 1 1
DEF. COUNS. J. 0 0 0 1
ENERGY L.J. 0 0 0 1
FED. COMM. L.J. 0 0 0 1
FLA. B.J. 0 0 0 1
F.R.D. (f) 23 7 2 1
FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 0 0 0 1
GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 0 0 0 1
GA. L. REV. 3 2 3 1
HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 4 4 3 1
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 0 0 0 1
HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 0 0 0 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 0 0 1 1
IDAHO L. REV. 0 0 0 1
INT'L BUS. LAW.' 0 0 0 1
J. MARSHALL L.
REV. (g) 0 0 2 1
J.L. & HEALTH 0 0 0 1
J.L. & TECH. 0 0 0 1
LAW & POL'Y 0 0 0 1
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of No. of No. of No. of
(1996- Citations Citations Citations Citations
1998) (1971-73) (1981-83) (1991-93) (1996-98)
LA. L. REV. 0 0 1 1
LOY. L.A.L. REV. 0 0 1 1
ME. L. REv. 0 0 0 1
MD. L. REV. 3 2 1 1
MICH. L. &
POL'Y REV. 0 0 0 1
NAT. RESOURCES J. 0 0 0 1
NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS 0 0 0 1
& PUB. POL'Y
N.C.L. REV. 6 4 1 1
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 0 0 0 1
RUTGERS L. REv. 0 0 0 1
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 0 0 0 1
S. ILL. U.L.J. 0 0 1 1
SMU L. REV. 0 0 0 1
SW. J.L. &
TRADEAM. 0 0 0 1
STAN. L.J. Bus.
& FIN. 0 0 0 1
SYRACUSE L. REV. 0 0 0 1
TULSA L.J. 0 0 0 1
U. BALT. L. REv. 0 0 0 1
U. CN. L. REv. 7 5 2 1
U. COLO. L. REv. (h) 5 0 1 1
U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 0 0 1 1
U. FLA. L. REv. 3 1 4 1
U. MIAMI L. REv. 0 0 0 1
U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 0 0 0 1
U.S.F. L. REV. 0 0 0 1
VILL. L. REV. 8 0 2 1
WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 0 0 0 1
WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 0 0 0 1
W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 0 0 0 1
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of No. of No. of No. of
(1996- Citations Citations Citations Citations
1998) (1971-73) (1981-83) (1991-93) (1996-98)
WIs. L. REv. 4 5 2 1
98 ADMIN. L. REV. 0 1 1 0
AM. BANK. L.J. 0 2 2 0
A.B.A.J. 17 8 1 0
AKRON L. REV. 0 1 1 0
ALA. L. REv. 0 0 1 0
ALB. L. REv. 0 1 1 0
AM. J. CRIM. L. 0 1 1 0
AM. U. L. REv. 0 2 1 0
ANTITRUST BULL. 0 2 1 0
BANKR. DEV. J. 0 0 1 0
BEHAV. SC. & L. 0 0 1 0
BYU L. REv. 0 0 3 0
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 0 0 1 0
BROOK. L. REV. 2 1 1 0
BUFF. L. REv. 4 7 1 0
CARDOZO L. REV. 0 0 8 0
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 0 0 1 0
CoNN.L.REv. 0 0 2 0
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 0 0 3 0
CRIME & DELINQ. 0 0 2 0
CuMB. L. REv. 0 0 1 0
DEPAUL L. REv. 2 2 5 0
DICK. L. REv. 4 0 2 0
HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL. 0 0 1 0
HARV. ENVTL.
L.REV. 0 0 1 0
How. L.J. 2 1 1 0
IND. L.J. 4 7 1 0
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 0 0 1 0
INT'L REV. L.
& EcoN. 0 0 1 0
J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 2 1 0
J. CORP. L. 0 0 5 0
J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 0 0 1 0
J.L. & ECON. 4 0 5 0
J. LEGAL STUD. 0 1 2 0
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of No. of No. of No. of
(1996- Citations Citations Citations Citations
1998) (1971-73) (1981-83) (1991-93) (1996-98)
J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 2 1 0
J. PAT.
[& TRADEMARK]
OFF. SOC'Y 3 0 3 0
J. ST. TAx'N 0 0 1 0
J. TAX'N 3 2 1 0
JUDICATURE 0 3 2 0
JURIMETRICS J. 0 0 5 0
KAN. L. REV. 0 0 1 0
LAB. LAW. 0 0 1 0
LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 10 11 1 0
LAW & SOC'YREV. 0 0 1 0
LAW Q. REV. 0 1 1 0
MIL. L. REV. 0 0 2 0
MISS. L.J. 4 2 1 0
MO. L. REV. 1 2 2 0
MONT. L. REV. 1 1 1 0
N.Y. ST. B.J. 1 0 1 0
N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. 0 0 1 0
OHIO ST. L.J. 2 3 2 0
PAC. L.J. 0 0 1 0
PEPP. L. REV. 0 0 1 0
RECUEIL DES
COURS (i) 0 0 2 0
SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 0 0 1 0
SETON HALL
L. REV. 1 1 1 0
STETSON L. REV. 0 0 1 0
SUP. CT. REV. 14 7 10 0
TAxLAw. 0 0 4 0
TAXNOTES 0 0 5 0
TEMP. L.Q. 5 3 1 0
TEX. B.J. 0 0 1 0
TUL. MAR. L.J. 0 0 2 0
U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 6 2 1 0
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS
1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank Journal No. of No. of No. of No. of
(1996- Citations Citations Citations Citations
1998) (1971-73) (1981-83) (1991-93) (1996-98)
U. PITT. L. REv. 3 3 2 0
UTAH B.J. 0 0 1 0
WASH. U.L.Q. 6 2 1 0
W. ST. U.L. REV. 0 0 1 0
WILLAMETTE
L. REv. 0 0 1 0
YALE J. INT'L L. 0 0 2 0
YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 0 0 2 0
a. The Court cited journals 271 times during the 1996-98 term.
b. The calculation ofjournal cites may include multiple citings of the same
journal within the same Supreme Court case. See supra note 9.
c. In November 1977, the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review changed its title to the Boston College Law Review, beginning with
volume 19.
d. In 1974, the Journal of Public Law changed its title to the Emory Law
Journal, beginning with volume 23.
e. In March-April 1952, the Illinois Law Review changed its title to the
Northwestern University Law Review, beginning with volume 23.
f. The Court cited the Federal Rules Decisions one time. Citations to cases in
the Federal Rules are not included.
g. In Winter 1980, the John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure
changed its title to the John Marshall Law Review, beginning with volume
13.
h. In Fall 1962, the Rocky Mountain Law Review changed its title to the
University of Colorado Law Review, beginning with volume 35.
i. Recueil des Cours is published by the Hague Academy of International
Law.
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, NET CHANGES
1971-71, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank
(1996-
1998)
Journal (a) Incremental Incremental
Net Change Net Change
71/73-81/83 (b) 81/83.91/93
I HARV. L. REV.
2 YALE L.J.
3 COLUM. L. REV.
4 MIcH. L. REV.
5 U. CHI. L. REV.
6 VA. L. REV.
7 CORNELL L. REv.
STAN. L. REv.
9 DUKE L.J.
VAND. L, REV.
11 N.Y.U. L. REV.
U. PA. L. REV.
13 B.C. L. REV. (c)
CAL. L. REV.
GEO. L.J.
S. CAL. L. REV.
UCLA L. REV.
*WASH. L. REV.
*YALE J. ON REG.
20 *ARK. L. REV.
B.U. L. REV.
*DUQ. L. REV.
EMORY L.J. (d)
HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
IOWA L. REV.
Nw. U. L. REV. (e)
27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
AM. J. INT'L L.
FORDHAM L. REV.
*FORDHAM URB.
L.J.
*GEO. WASH. L. REV.
*HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y
*MINN. L. REV.
NOTRE DAME L.
REV.
-31.95%
-25.00%
-1.89%
18.52%
37.93%
-43.24%
66.67%
-19.05%
0.00%
0.00%
-34.62%
-43.18%
-80.00%
-14.81%
-23.81%
-40.00%
600.00%
-40.87%
-17.65%
-13.46%
-53.13%
-35.00%
-38.10%
-20.00%
-23.53%
-11.11%
-40.00%
-5.88%
-56.00%
0.00%
-8.70%
-37.50%
100.00%
71.43%
Incremental
Net Change
91/93-96/98
-55.88%
-45.24%
-60.00%
-20.00%
-61.54%
-30.77%
0.00%
-38.46%
-25.00%
0.00%
-68.75%
-54.55%
300.00%
-80.95%
-60.00%
-66.67%
-66.67%
400.00% 0.00% -20.00%
-100.00%
0.00%
-100.00%
22.22%
-33.33%
200.00%
-50.00%
50.00%
-66.67% 200.00%
-50.00%
-36.36% -57.14%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% -33.33%
200.00% -77.78%
Overall
Net Change
71/73-96/98
-82.25%
-66.18%
-66.04%
-55.56%
-65.52%
-75.68%
33.33%
-61.90%
-33.33%
-40.00%
-80.77%
-88.64%
-20.00%
-85.19%
-80.95%
-60.00%
300.00%
200.00%
50.00%
0.00%
-70.00%
-66.67%
-33.33%
100.00%
-66.67%
100.00%
-83.33% 500.00% -66.67%
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FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, NET CHANGES
1971-71, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank
(1996-
1998)
Journal Incremental
Net Change
71/73-81/83
Incremental
Net Change
81/83-91/93
Incremental
Net Change
91/93-96/98
Overall
Net Change
71/73-96/98
*ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
TEX. L. REV.
*WM. & MARY L.
REV.
38 *AM. CRIM. L. REV.
*ARIZ. L. REV.
*ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J.
*BANKING L.J.
*Bus. LAW.
*CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J.
*CATH. U. L. REV.
*COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV.
*COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS.
*CONST. COMM.
*CONsT. L.J.
*CRIM. L. BULL.
*DEF. COUNS. J.
*ENERGY L.J.
*FED. COMM. L.J.
*FLA. B.J.
F.R.D. (f)
*FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J.
*GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS
GA. L. REV.
HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV.
*HARV. J.L. &
TECH.
*HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q.
*HOFSTRA L. REV.
*IDAHO L. REV.
12.50% -33.33%
-66.67%
-33.33%
-100.00%
-69.57% -71.43%
-33.33% 50.00%
0.00% -25.00%
-66.67% -75.00%
-50.00%
-50.00%
-83.33%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
-50.00% -95.65%
-66.67% -66.67%
-66.67% -75.00%
0.00%
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SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank
(1996-
1998)
Journal Incremental
Net Change
71/73-81/83
Incremental
Net Change
81/83-91193
Incremental
Net Change
91/93-96/98
Overall
Net Change
71/73-96/98
*INT'L BUS. LAW.
*J. MARSHALL L. REV. (g)
*J.L. & HEALTH
*J.L. & TECH.
*LAW & POL'Y
*LA. L. REV.
*LOY. L.A. L. REV.
*ME. L. REV.
MD. L. REV. -33.
*MICH. L. & POL'Y
REV.
*NAT. RESOURCES J.
*NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y
N.C.L. REv. -33.:
*N. ILL. U. L. REV.
*RUTGERS L. REV.
*ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
*S. Ill. U. L.J.
*SMU L. Rev.
*Sw J.L. & TRADE
-50.00%
0.00%
0.00%
-50.00% 0.00%
33% -75.00% 0.00%
-66.67%
-83.33%
0.00%
AM.
*STAN. L.J. BUS.
& FIN.
*SYRACUSE L. REV.
*TULSA L.J.
*U. BALT. L. REv.
U. CrN. L. REv. -28.57% -60.00% -50.00%
*U. COLO. L. REV. (h) 0.00%
*U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 0.00%
U. FLA. L. REV. -66.67% 300.00% -75.00%
*U. MIAMI L. REV.
*U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV.
*U.S.F. L. REV.
-85.71%
-80.00%
-66.67%
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APPENDIX IV CONTINUED
FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, NET CHANGES
1971-71, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Journal
VILL. L. REV.
*WAKE FOREST L.
REV.
*WASH. & LEE L.
REV.
*W. NEW ENG. L.
Incremental
Net Change
71/73-81/83
Incremental
Net Change
81/83-91/93
-100.00%
Incremental
Net Change
91/93-96/98
-50.00%
Overall
Net Change
71/73-96/98
-87.50%
REV.
WIs. L. REv. 25.00%
98 *AM. BANKR. L.J.
A.B.A. J. -52.94%
*ADMIN. L. REV.
*AKRON L. REV.
*ALA. L. REV.
*ALB. L. REV.
*AM. J. CRIM. L.
*AM. U. L. REV.
*ANTITRUST BULL.
*BANKR. DEv. J.
*BEHAV. SCI. & L.
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
BROOK. L. REV. -50.00%
BUFF. L. REV. 75.00%
*BYU L. REV.
*CARDOZO L. REV.
*CHI.-KENT L. REV.
*CUMB. L. REV.
*CONN. L. REV.
*COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP)
*CRIME & DELINQ.
DEPAUL L. REV. 0.00%
*DICK. L. REV. -100.00%
*HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'Y
*HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV.
HOW. L.J. -50.00%
IND. L.J. 75.00%
-60.00% -50.00%
0.00%
-87.50% -100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
-50.00% -100.00%
-50.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
-85.71% -100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
150.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
-85.71% -100.00%
Rank
(1996-
1998)
-75.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
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APPENDIX IV CONTINUED
FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, NET CHANGES
1971-71, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Rank
(1996-
1998)
Journal Incremental
Net Change
71/73-81/83
Incremental
Net Change
81/83-91/93
Incremental
Net Change
91/93-96/98
Overall
Net Change
71/73-96/98
*INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
*INT'L REV. L.
& ECON.
J. AIR L. & COM.
*J. CORP. L.
*J. CRIM. L.
*J.L. & ECON.
*J. LEGAL STUD.
J. MAR. L. & COM.
*J. PAT.
[&TRADEMARK]
OFF. SOC'Y
*J. ST. TAx'N
J. TAx'N
*JUDICATURE
*JURIMETRICS J.
*KAN. L. REV.
*LAB. LAW.
LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS.
*LAW & Soc'y
*LAW Q. REV.
*MIL. L. REv.
Miss. L.J.
Mo. L. REV.
MONT. L. REV.
*N.Y. ST. B.J.
*N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE
OHIO ST. L.J.
*PAC. L.J.
*PEPP. L. REV.
*REcUEIL DES
CouRs ()
*SANTA CLARA
L. REV.
SETON HALL
L. REV.
-100.00%
-100.00%
100.00% -50.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00% -100.00%
100.00% -100.00%
100.00% -50.00% -100.00%
-100.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
-33.33% -50.00% -100.00%
-33.33% -100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
10.00% -90.90% -100.00%
-100.00%
0.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
-50.00% -50.00% -100.00%
100.00% 0.00% -100.00%
0.00% 0.00% -100.00%
-100.00% -100.00%
-100.00%
50.00% -33.33% -100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
0.00% 0.00% -100.00%
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APPENDIX IV CONTINUED
FREQUENCY OF CITATIONS, NET CHANGES
1971-71, 1981-83, 1991-93, 1996-98
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Journal Incremental
Net Change
71/73-81/83
Incremental
Net Change
81183-91/93
Incremental
Net Change
91/93-96/98
*STETSON L. REV. -100.00%
SUP. CT. REV. -50.00% 42.86% -100.00%
*TAX LAW. -100.00%
*TAx NOTES -100.00%
TEMP. L.Q. -40.00% -66.67% -100.00%
*TEX. B.J. -100.00%
*TUL. MAR. L.J. -100.00%
U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM -66.67% -50.00% -100.00%
U. PITT. L. REv. 0.00% -33.33% -100.00%
*UTAH B.J. -100.00%
WASH. U. L.Q. -66.67% -50.00% -100.00%
*W. ST. U.L. REv. -100.00%
*WILLAMETTE L. REV. -100.00%
*YALE J. INT'L L. -100.00%
*YALE L. & POL'Y REV. -100.00%
Overall
Net Change
71/73-96/98
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
-100.00%
a. This 1996-1998 journal cite did not have a previous cite in one or all of the
1971-1973, 1981-1983, or 1991-1993 terms.
b. The Court cited journals 271 times during the 1996-98 term.
c. The calculation ofjournal cites may include multiple citings of the same
journal within the same Supreme Court case. See supra note 9.
d. In November 1977, the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review changed its title to the Boston College Law Review, beginning with
volume 19.
e. In 1974, the Journal of Public Law changed its title to the Emory Law
Journal, beginning with volume 23.
f. In March-April 1952, the Illinois Law Review changed its title to the
Northwestern University Law Review, beginning with volume 23.
g. The Court cited the Federal Rules Decisions one time. Citations to cases in
the Federal Rules are not included.
h. In Winter 1980, the John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure
changed its title to the John Marshall Law Review, beginning with volume
13.
i. In Fall 1962, the Rocky Mountain Law Review changed its title to the
University of Colorado Law Review, beginning with volume 35.
j. Receil des Cours is published by the Hague Academy of International Law.
Rank
(1996-
1998)
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APPENDIX V
JOURNALS WITH INCREASED CITATIONS
OCT. 1971-OCT. 1973 TERMTO OCT. 1996-OCr. 1998 TERM
Rank Journal (a) No. of No. of Percentage
(1996 Citations Citations Increase
-1998) 1971-1973 1996-1998
13 UCLA L. REV. 1 4 300.00%
20 B.U. L. REV. 1 3 200.00%
27 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 2 100.00%
20 EMORY L.J. (b) 2 3 50.00%
7 CORNELL L. REV. 6 8 33.33%
a. Inclusion in this table is limited to journals with at least 2 citations during
the 1996-1998 Supreme Court term.
b. In 1974, the Journal of Public Law changed its title to the Emory Law
Journal, beginning with volume 23.
APPENDIX VI
JOURNALS WITH INCREASED CITATIONS
OCT. 1981-OCT. 1983 TERM TO OCT. 1996-OcT. 1998 TERM
Rank Journal (a) No. of No. of Percentage
1996-1998 Citations Citations Increase
1981-1983 1996-1998
13 B.C. L. REV. (b) 1 4 300.00%
27 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 2 100.00%
a. Inclusion in this table is limited to journals with at least 2 citations during
the 1996-1998 Supreme Court Term.
b. In November 1977, the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review changed its title to the Boston College Law Review, beginning with
volume 19.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX VII
JOURNALS WITH INCREASED CITATIONS
OCT. 1991-OCT. 1993 TERM TO OCT. 1996-OcT. 1998 TERM
Rank Journal (a) No. of No. of Percentage
1996-1998 Citations Citations Increase
1991-1993 1996-1998
13 B.C. L. REV. (b) 1 4 300.00%
20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 3 200.00%
20 EMORY L.J. (c) 2 3 50.00%
a. Inclusion in this table is limited to journals with at least two citations during
the 1996-1998 Supreme Court term.
b. In November 1977, the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review changed its title to the Boston College Law Review, beginning with
volume 19.
c. In 1974, the Journal of Public Law changed its title to the Emory Law
Journal, beginning with volume 23.
APPENDIX VIII
FREQUENCY ON CITATIONS BY TIER
OCT. 1971-OCT. 1973 TERM TO OCT. 1996-OcT. 1998 TERM
Tier of Cited
Journals (a) 1971-1973 (b) 1996-1998 Net Change
Top 10% 562/963 58.36% 130/271 47.97% -10.39%
2d 10% 139/963 14.43% 41/271 15.13% 0.70%
3d 10% 78/963 8.10% 26/271 9.59% 1.49%
4th 10% 54/963 5.61% 17/271 6.27% 0.66%
5th 10% 40/963 4.15% 10/271 3.69% -0.46%
Bottom 50% 87/963 9.03% 46/271 16.97% 7.94%
a. The first entry, for example, represents journals that the Supreme Court
cited most frequently during each period and that comprise the top 10% of
journals that the Court cited during that period. The calculation of tiers for
the 1996-1998 term approximates 10% by varying between 9 and 10
journals per tier.
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b. The entry notes the number of citations that the tier garnered during the
given period out of the total number of citations to legal journals during that
period. It also states the finding as a percentage.
APPENDIX IX
FREQUENCY ON CITATIONS BY TIER
OCT. 1981-OCT. 1983 TERM TO OCT. 1996-OCT. 1998 TERM
(a) (b)
Tier of Cited
Journals 1981-1983 1996-1998 Net Change
Top 10% 439/767 56.84% 130/271 47.97% -8.87%
2d 10% 117/767 15.25% 41/271 15.13% -0.12%
3d 10% 70/767 9.13% 26/271 9.59% 0.46%
4th 10% 39/767 5.08% 17/271 6.27% 1.19%
5th 10% 28/767 3.65% 10/271 3.69% 0.04%
Bottom 50% 77/767 10.04% 46/271 16.97% 6.93%
a. The first entry, for example, represents journals that the Supreme Court
cited most frequently during each period and that comprise the top 10% of
journals that the Court cited during that period. The calculation of tiers for
the 1996-1998 term approximates 10% by varying between 9 and 10
journals per tier.
b. The entry notes the number of citations that the tier garnered during the
given period out of the total number of citations to legal journals during that
period. It also states the finding as a percentage.
APPENDIX X
FREQUENCY ON CITATIONS BY TIER
OCT. 1991-OCT. 1993 TERM To OCT. 1996-OCT. 1998 TERM
(a) (b)
Tier of Cited
Journals 1991-1993 1996-1998 Net Change
Top 10% 304/577 52.69% 130/271 47.97% -4.72%
2d 10% 92/577 15.94% 41/271 15.13% -0.81%
3d 10% 62/577 10.75% 26/271 9.59% -1.16%
4th 10% 29/577 5.03% 17/271 6.27% 1.24%
5th 10% 26/577 4.51% 10/271 3.69% -0.82%
Bottom 50% 64/577 11.09% 46/271 16.97% 5.88%
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a. The first entry, for example, represents journals that the Supreme Court
cited most frequently during each period and that comprise the top 10% of
journals that the Court cited during that period. The calculation of tiers for
the 1996-1998 term approximates 10% by varying between 9 and 10
journals per tier.
b. The entry notes the number of citations that the tier garnered during the
given period out of the total number of citations to legal journals during that
period. It also states the finding as a percentage.
APPENDIX XI
AGE OF CITATIONS
THE NUMBER OF CITATIONS TO ARTICLES
ACCORDING TO DATE OF ARTICLES' PUBLICATION
FIvE YEAR PERIOD NUMBER OF CITATIONS TO ARTICLES PUBLISHED
DURING EACH FIVE YEAR PERIOD
1995-1998 (a) 59
1990-1994 70
1985-1989 39
1980-1984 27
1975-1979 8
1970-1974 14
1965-1969 10
1960-1964 5
1955-1959 9
1950-1954 5
1945-1949 5
1940-1944 3
1935-1939 5
1930-1934 4
1925-1929 6
1920-1924 0
1915-1919 0
1910-1914 1
1905-1909 0
1900-1904 1
1895-1899 0
1890-1894 0
1885-1889 0
(a) This period was slightly less than five years because the study ended.
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APPENDIX XII
AGE OF ARTICLES CITED, OCT. 1996-OCT. 1998
SUPREME COURT TERMS
Number of Citations
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